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Section 1983 Violations
by State Officials Can Subject Them
to Suit as Individuals

Trial Court Improperly Reduced
Attorneys' Fee Award

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
Legislature v. Eu,

In this proceeding, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled 8-0 that state officials sued
in their individual capacities for civil
rights violations are "persons" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which
expressly creates a cause of action for
improper deprivation of civil rights by
"every person" acting "under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia." The Court expressly eliminated the ambiguity arising
from its 1989 decision in Will v. Michigan Department ofState Police, 491 U.S.
58, which held that state officials "acting
in their official capacities" are outside
the class of "persons" subject to liability
under section 1983. (See CRLR Vol. 9,
No. 3 (Summer 1989) p. 130 for background information on Will.)
The Court noted that personal-capacity suits seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions
taken under color of state law. According
to the Court, "officers sued in their personal capacity come to court as individuals. A government official in the role of
personal-capacity defendant thus fits
comfortably within the statutory term
'person."' The Court rejected Hafer's argument that section 1983 liability turns
not on the capacity in which state officials are sued, but on the capacity in
which they acted when injuring the plaintiff. The Court noted that her theory
"would absolutely immunize state officials from personal liability for acts within
their authority and necessary to fulfilling
governmental responsibilities" and held
that "[s]tate executive officials are not
entitled to absolute immunity for their
official actions." Thus, the Court concluded that state officers are not absolutely immune from personal liability
under section 1983 solely by virtue of
the "official" nature of their acts.
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The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California erred when it reduced the
amount of attorneys' fees awarded to
civil rights plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C.
section 1988; that statute authorizes
courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees
to prevailing parties in civil rights litigation. In the underlying action, plaintiffs
brought suit against over 50 defendants,
alleging that they illegally detained them
and conducted an improper search of
their residence in a misguided attempt to
find an escaped prisoner. Prior to trial,
plaintiffs rejected a $45,000 settlement
offer; that offer included $39,000 worth
of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees that had accrued and would have left plaintiffs with
$6,000. Following trial, a jury awarded
plaintiffs a total of $24,006 in compensatory and punitive damages against only
three of the defendants; the district court
subsequently awarded plaintiffs $90,333
in attorneys' fees, after discounting the
full "lodestar" amount by 20% to reflect
plaintiffs' limited success against the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed the district
court's award of attorneys' fees, arguing
that the court erred when it adjusted the
fee award downward to reflect limited
success.
Although acknowledging that district
courts have considerable discretion in
determining attorneys' fees, the Ninth
Circuit determined that the district court's
20% reduction of the full amount was
based on clearly erroneous reasoning.
When reducing the attorneys' fee award
for limited success, the district court cited
plaintiffs' rejection of the settlement offer, stating that the result of plaintiffs'
decision to proceed to trial "was to win
a much smaller figure than they could
have obtained much earlier by simply
accepting defendants' offer." In rejecting the district court's holding, the Ninth
Circuit recognized that plaintiffs gained
over $18,000 by litigating their case to
its conclusion. The Ninth Circuit remanded the matter to district court "with
another opportunity to consider whether
an adjustment to the lodestar amount is
appropriate."

_Cal. 3d_, 91 D.A.R. 12510,
No. S0l9660 (Oct. 10, 1991).
Legislative Term Limits of
Proposition 140 Are Constitutional
In this proceeding, the California Supreme Court determined that Proposition 140, the "Political Reform Act of
1990" enacted at the November 1990
general election, is constitutionally valid
in all respects other than its proposed
restrictions on the pensions of incumbent lawmakers. The stated purpose of
Proposition 140 is to "restore a free and
democratic system of fair elections, and
to encourage qualified candidates to seek
public office" by limiting "the powers of
incumbency." The initiative measure
sought to accomplish these goals by restricting retirement benefits, limiting
state-financed incumbent staff and support services, and placing limits upon the
number of terms which may be served.
As a preliminary matter, the court considered whether Proposition 140 imposes
a "lifetime ban" on officers who have
served the specified number of terms, or
merely limits the number of consecutive
terms they may serve. The court noted
that the introduction to Proposition 140
refers to curtailing "[t]he ability of legislators to serve unlimited ... terms," by
limiting "the numberofterms which may
be served." Further, the court noted that
the measure repeatedly announced its intent to eliminate "career politicians," and
held that such language supports the view
that a lifetime ban was intended. The
court also reviewed the analysis and arguments in the official ballot pamphlets
to determine the voters' intent regarding
this matter. The court gave significant
weight to the fact that the opponents'
ballot arguments against Proposition 140
forcefully and repeatedly stressed the
measure's "lifetime ban," noting that the
proponents failed to contradict the "lifetime ban" contention in their ballot argument. The court thus concluded that
Proposition 140's term limitations extend over the lifetime of each affected
officeholder.
The court then considered whether
the measure effected a constitutional revision-which may be accomplished
only by convening a constitutional convention and obtaining popular ratification, or by legislative submission of the
measure to the voters-rather than a mere
amendment, which may be accomplished
by citizens' initiative. According to the
court, to find a revision, it must necessar-
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ily or inevitably appear from the face of
the challenged provision that the measure will substantially alterthe basic governmental framework set forth in the state
constitution. ·'Proposition 140 on its face
does not affect either the structure or the
foundational powers of the Legislature.
which remains free to enact whatever
laws it deems appropriate. The challenged
measure alters neither the contents of
those laws nor the process by which they
are adopted. No legislative power is diminished or delegated to other persons
or agencies." The court held that petitioners' claims of momentous, detrimental consequences to the state's governmental scheme are "largely speculative,''
and added that ·'respondents argue with
equal conviction that Proposition l 40's
term limitations will free the entire process from the control of assertedly entrenched, apathetic. veteran incumbents.
thereby allowing fresh creative energies
to flourish free of vested, self-serving
legislative interests.'' In finding that nothing on the face of Proposition 140 effects
a constitutional revision, the court also
stated that "[t]o hold that reform measures such as Proposition 140, which are
directed at reforming the Legislature itself. can be initiated only with the
Legislature's own consent and approval,
could eliminate the only practical means
the people possess to achieve reform of
that branch."
The court next addressed petitioners'
claim that Proposition 140 violates the
constitutional single-subject rule by combining in a single measure such "disparate" subjects as term and budgetary limitations and pension restrictions.
According to the court, an initiative measure does not violate the single-subject
requirement if, despite its varied collateral effects, all of its parts are "reasonably germane" to each other. and to the
general purpose or object of the initiative. The court found that the unifying
theme or common purpose of Proposition 140 is "incumbency reform," and
held that the various provisions of the
measure are reasonably germane to that
subject.
The court then considered petitioners' contention that the term limitations
of Proposition 140 violate the first and
fourteenth amendments of the federal
constitution by substantially burdening
two fundamental rights: the right to vote
and the right to be a candidate for public
office. The court determined that three
separate elements must be considered in
ascertaining the constitutionality of state
laws restricting access to the ballot: (I)
the nature of the injury to the rights affected; (2) the interests asserted by the
state as justifications for that injury; and

(3) the necessity for imposing the particular burden affecting the plaintiff's
rights, rather than some less drastic alternatives. The court acknowledged that
Proposition 140 affects the rights of voters and candidates, but noted several mitigating factors. including the voters' continued right to vote for any qualified
candidates and the candidates' ability to
run for other public offices. As to the
second element. the court stated that
"[t]he universal authority is that restriction upon the succession of incumbents
serves a rational public policy and that.
while restrictions may deny qualified men
an opportunity to serve. as a general rule
the overall health of the body politic is
enhanced by limitations on continuous
tenure." Regarding the third element, the
court determined that. realistically, "only
a lifetime ban could protect against various kinds of continued exploitation of
the 'advantages of incumbency' captured
through past terms in office." The court
thus concluded that "the interests of the
state in incumbency reform outweigh any
injury to incumbent office holders and
those who would vote for them" and that
"the legitimate and compelling interests
set forth in the measure outweigh the
narrower interests of petitioner legislators and the constituents who wish to
perpetuate their incumbency.''
The court then addressed petitioners·
assertion that Proposition 140 is. in effect, an unlawful bill of attainder, defined as a "legislative punishment of any
form or severity, of specifically designated persons or groups." The court stated
that broad reform measures are frequently
prompted by particular acts or circumstances involving specific individuals, but
such measures would not constitute improper bills of attainder unless an intent
to punish such individuals clearly appears from their face, or from the circumstances surrounding their passage.
Although acknowledging that the
measure's proponents sought to limit the
terms of incumbent legislators such as
Assembly Speaker Willie Brown (who
has been in office since 1964) and Senate
President pro Tempore David Roberti
(who has been in office since 1971 ), the
court pointed out that "Proposition 140
applies with equal force to all state legislators, current and future" and concluded
that Proposition 140 does not constitute
a bill of attainder.
Finally, the court considered petitioners' claim that Proposition 140's limitations on the pension rights of incumbent
legislators are unconstitutional as an invalid impairment of contract under the
federal constitution. The court agreed
with petitioners that provisions of Proposition 140 terminate the pension system
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entirely as to additional benefits accruing for future services: the court also
agreed with petitioners that incumbent
legislators have a vested right to earn
additional pension benefits through continued service. The court thus concluded
that the pension restrictions of Proposition 140 are unconstitutional under the
federal contracts clause as applied to incumbent legislators because they infringe
on the vested pension rights of those
persons. However, the court also found
that nonincumbent legislators first assuming office after Proposition 140 became effective acquired no vested or
protectible right to a continuation of the
pension system in operation prior to their
employment and upheld the provisions
as applied to them. Finally. the court
found that "[a]lthough a portion of Proposition 140 is invalid as applied to incumbent legislators, Its invalidity does not
affect the remaining provisions of the
measure. for those provisions can be
given effect without regard to the validity or operation of the invalid pension
restrictions."

Wilson v. Eu,
_Cal. 3d_, 91 D.A.R. 13082
No. S022835 (Oct. 23, 1991 ).
Supreme Court Takes Over
Redistrict111g Task

On September 25, following Governor Wilson's veto of three plans containmg new districts drawn by the Democrat-controlled legislature. the California
Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction by ordering issuance of an alternative writ of mandate contemplating
the drafting and adoption by the court of
reapportionment plans for the state's legislative, congressional, and Board of
Equalization districts (Wilson v. Eu, 54
Cal. 3d 471 ( 1991) (Wilson/)). The court
appointed the Honorable George A.
Brown, retired Associate Justice of the
Fifth District Court of Appeal, the Honorable Rafael H. Galceran, retired Judge
of the Los Angeles County Superior
Court. and the Honorable Thomas
Kongsgaard, retired Judge of the Napa
County Superior Court, as Special Masters on Reapportionment. In Wilson /,
the court also directed the Masters to
commence public hearings within thirty
days of their appointment, and to present
their recommendations to the court no
later than November 29; the court also
called for a thirty-day period of briefing
and public comment following the filing
of the Masters' recommendations prior
to the time set for oral argument before
the court.
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In this proceeding, the court considered proposals submitted by Secretary of
State March Fong Eu for implementing
reapportionment plans at a time and in a
manner which would avoid postponing
or bifurcating the June 2 primary election. Specifically, the court agreed with
the Secretary's recommendations that (I)
the court make the Masters' recommended plans available to county election officials as soon as available "in a
computer-readable electronic medium
with supporting maps and hard copy";
(2) the Secretary of State submit the recommended plans to the U.S. Department
of Justice "on an informational basis" for
eventual preclearance under the Voting
Rights Act, immediately upon filing them
with the court; (3) on the filing of the
plans with the court, the Secretary immediately direct county election officials
to begin encoding the Masters' recommended plans into their computer files;
(4) the Secretary direct county election
officials to postpone issuing petitions for
gathering signatures in lieu of filing fees
until the court files its opinion designating the proper district lines; (4) the court
set January 28 as the deadline for filing
its opinion; and (6) the Secretary direct
county officials that the first day for circulating in lieu petitions, for filing declarations of intent for legislative office,
and for filing declarations of candidacy
and nomination papers for legislative and
congressional seats is February I 0.
On December 2. the Special Masters
released their recommended redistricting plans, which were widely viewed as
favorable to Republicans, while also increasing the chances of minority representation in the legislature and Congress.
The court accepted written comments on
the recommendations until January 13,
when it was scheduled to conduct a hearing on the matter.

Rider v. County of San Diego,
_Cal. 3d_, 91 D.A.R. 15689,
No. S0l7917 (Dec. 19, 1991).
Sales Tax for Justice Facilities
Is l111'Gltd U11der Propositio11 13

The California Supreme Court has
struck down a tax imposed on sales occurring in San Diego County for the purpose of financing the construction and
operation of criminal detention and/or
courthouse facilities for the County, finding that the tax is invalid because it was
not approved by at least two-thirds of the
County's voters, as required by article
XIII, section 4 of the California constitution (added by Proposition 13, a 1978
initiative measure), which requires a
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supermajority vote with respect to any
"special taxes" sought to be imposed by
"cities, counties and special districts."
In 1987, the legislature enacted the
San Diego County Regional Justice Facility Financing Agency, and directed the
Agency to adopt a tax ordinance imposing a supplemental sales tax of 0.05%
throughout the County for the purpose of
financing the construction of justice facilities. The legislation also provided for
a countywide election held for the purpose of approving the tax ordinance by
simple majority vote, and specified that
the Agency possesses no tax power other
than the foregoing sales tax. At a June
1988 election, the County's voters approved the tax ordinance by a bare majority vote (50.8% ); plaintiffs, a group of
County taxpayers, filed the present suit
to challenge the validity of the tax.
The Supreme Court determined that
the Agency must be deemed a "special
district" under section 4, despite its lack
of power to levy a tax on real property;
the court noted that to hold otherwise
would create a wide loophole in Proposition 13 by allowing cities and counties to
arrange for the formation of local taxing
districts to finance municipal functions
without securing the requisite two-thirds
·voter approval. Thus, the court held that
the term "special district" includes any
local taxing agency created to raise funds
for city or county purposes to replace
revenues lost by reason of the restrictions of Proposition 13. As a result, the
court invalidated the Agency's tax levy
on the basis that it failed to secure the
requisite two-thirds voter approval.

Whitman v. Superior Court,
_Cal. 3d_, 91 D.A.R. I 5081,
No. S018847 (Dec. 9, 1991).
Testimo11y by Reader of Police Report
Does Not Establish Probable Cause

In this case, the California Supreme
Court resolved various issues presented
by the June 1990 adoption of an initiative measure designated on the ballot as
Proposition 11 S. the Crime Victims Justice Reform Act. Specifically, petitioner
challenged the provisions of the measure
that authorize the admission of hearsay
evidence at preliminary hearings in criminal cases, and contested the sufficiency
and competency of the evidence presented at his preliminary hearing. At
petitioner's preliminary hearing on felony
drunk driving charges, the People's only
witness was Officer Bruce Alexander,
who was not one of the arresting or investigating officers and who had no direct. personal knowledge of petitioner's

alleged offenses; Alexander first became
aware of the investigating officer's report, and of the case against petitioner,
on the morning of the preliminary hearing after the district attorney handed him
a copy of the report. Over petitioner's
objection, Alexander was allowed to recount to the magistrate various entries
made in the report of the investigating
officer, Officer Navin. Despite
petitioner's objections and his argument
that Alexander could not personally identify him as the suspect stopped by Navin,
the magistrate held petitioner to answer
on the counts charged.
On appeal, the California Supreme
Court agreed with petitioner that, as a
matter of sound statutory interpretation,
Alexander should not have been permitted to relate the contents of Navin's investigative report because Alexander was
not involved in the investigation of the
case and had no personal knowledge of
the circumstances under which Navin's
report was prepared. "Proposition 11 S
does not authorize a finding of probable
cause based on the testimony of a
noninvestigating officer or 'reader'
merely reciting the police report of an
investigating officer." The court opined
that the probable intent of the framers of
the measure was "to allow a properly
qualified investigating officer to relate
out-of-court statements by crime victims
or witnesses, including other law enforcement personnel, without requiring the
victims' or witnesses' presence in court.
The testifying officer, however, must not
be a mere reader but must have sufficient
knowledge of the crime or the circumstances under which the out-of-court
statement was made so as to meaningfully assist the magistrate in assessing
the reliability of the statement." This
holding seemingly foreshadows the reversal of Montez v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, 233 Cal. App. 3d
91 7 ( 1991 ), in which the Second District
Court of Appeal held that no applicable
law indicates that only so-called "first
level hearsay" is admissible at the preliminary examination, and that the "voters did not approve an initiative ... which
contains ... limitations on the use of
[multiple level] hearsay"; the California
Supreme Court granted Montez· petition
for review in this proceeding on October
23. (See CRLR Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1991)
pp. 217-18 for background information
on the Montez case.)
In Whitma11, however, the court rejected petitioner's claim that Proposition
I I 5 's authorization of the use of hearsay
during a preliminary hearing violates the
federal confrontation clause, holding that
the constitutional right of confrontation
is basically a trial right. The court also
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rejected petitioner's claim that Proposition 115 denies him due process by
impliedly providing that only the prosecution may introduce hearsay at the
preliminary hearing. The court noted
that defendants continue to enjoy the
benefits of all preexisting hearsay exceptions, and that-theoretically-the
new provision might be interpreted to
permit the defendant to call a law enforcement officer to relate statements
which might rebut a finding of probable
cause. Finally. the court rejected
petitioner's claim that the new hearsay
procedures violate the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers in that
the prosecutor is given excessive power
to control the quantity and quality of the
evidence admitted at preliminary hearings. The court noted that Proposition
115 amended the state constitution to
allow admission of hearsay evidence at
preliminary hearings; because such procedure is specifically authorized by the
constitution, the general separation of
powers doctrine does not apply. The
court also stated that no separation of
powers violation exists. as the magistrate retains full authority and discretion to rule on the sufficiency of the
defendant's proof offer, to allow the
admission of relevant defense evidence,
and ultimately to determine whether the
proffered evidence demonstrates probable cause to hold the defendant to answer for the charged offenses.

CALIFORNIA COURTS
OF APPEAL

Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank,
_Cal. App. 3d_,
91 D.A.R. 13951.
No. A049948 (Nov. 12, 1991).

Fee Award is Appropriate
In Consumer Protection Action
The First District Court of Appeal
has upheld a judgment requiring Wells
Fargo Bank to pay plaintiffs their attorney fees, costs, and expenses in the total
sum of almost $2 million, based on
California's "private attorney general"
statute (Civil Procedure Code section
I021.5). The underlying action involved
a class action which challenged Wells
Fargo Bank's assessment offees against
credit card customers who failed to make
timely payments or exceeded their credit
limits; in a companion case, the First
District affirmed a $5 million judgment
in favor of the class.
Section 1021.5 permits a fee award
when the following criteria are met: (I)
the action has resulted in the enforce-

ment of an important right affecting the
public interest; (2) a significant benefit
has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons; (3) the
necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make
the award appropriate: and (4) the fees
should not in the interest of justice be
paid out of the recovery, if any.
Initially. the court determined that if
the estimated value of a class action
common fund recovery. determined as
of the time the vital litigation decisions
were being made, does not exceed actual litigation costs by a substantial margin, the financial burden of private enforcement is such as to make it
appropriate to award attorneys' fees
under section I021.5. After reviewing
the relevant figures, the court found it
to be "a close issue" whether estimated
value exceeds by a substantial margin
the actual litigation costs. However, the
court stated that "even if the estimated
value of this case is viewed as exceeding actual litigation costs by a substantial margin, the public benefits from
the litigation are so significant that an
award of fees under section I 021.5 is
appropriate."
The court also concluded that the
trial court's decision to apply a 1.5 lodestar multiplier to the award of attorneys' fees was appropriate, noting that
the $5 million award in the underlying
action was an "excellent result" given
the complexity of the case and the disparity in resources available to the opposing parties. (See supra agency report on STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT for more information.)

City of Gilroy v. State Board
of Equalization,
_Cal. App. 3d_,
91 D.A.R. 13079,
No. A052792 (Oct. 22, 1991).

City's Tax Suit Entitles It
to Recover Attorneys' Fees

Under Equity Principles
In this case, the First District Court
of Appeal considered the first impression issue whether a public entity may
recover attorneys' fees under the equitable common fund and substantial benefit doctrines, despite the fact that the
codified private attorney general theory
(Code of Civil Procedure section I 021.5)
prohibits allowances in favor of public
entities. The underlying lawsuit was
prosecuted by the City of Gilroy against
the State Board of Equalization (Board)
and Scientific Games, a vendor of the
California State Lottery Commission
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(CSL), regarding whether Scientific
Games' sale of printed tickets to CSL is
exempt from taxation under the Lottery
Act. In 1989, the First District determined that, contrary to the position taken
by the Board, Scientific Games' sales
of printed tickets to CSL are not exempt
from state or local taxation. City of

Gilrov v. State Board of Equalization,
212 Cal. App. 3d 589 ( 1989). Arguing
that its successful litigation of that matter created a new fund of tax revenues
for the state, Gilroy petitioned the court
for an award of attorneys' fees under
the common fund and substantial benefit doctrines. Although no relief was
sought under section I 021.5, the trial
court determined that the statutory provision controlled, and forbade, an award
of fees to Gilroy.
On appeal, the First District Court of
Appeal rejected the trial court's holding
on three grounds. First, the court noted
that Gilroy had sought fees under the
equitable common fund and substantial
benefit doctrines, not section 1021.5,
and the trial court gave no reason why
those theories were unavailable to
Gilroy. Second, the First District determined that section I 021.5 precludes an
award of attorneys' fees in favor of a
public entity only when the award is
made pursuant to its own provisions.
Third, the First District concluded that
section I 02 l .5 does not purport to govern fee awards made on any other basis.
"Thus it cannot be construed as abrogating the common fund and substantial benefit doctrines; these still remain
viable predicates for fee awards under
the appropriate circumstances."
The court then considered whether
the substantial benefit and common fund
theories are viable options for awarding
attorneys' fees to public entities. The
court noted that the substantial benefit
doctrine rests on the principles that those
who have been unjustly enriched at
another's expense should under some
circumstances bear their fair share of
the costs entailed in producing the benefits they have obtained, and found that
"because constituents of other public
entities stood to benefit from Gilroy's
efforts as a matter of course, it makes
perfect sense under the common fund
or substantial benefit theory to spread
the cost of attorneys' fees among these
entities." The court remanded the matter to the trial court to determine (I) the
precise amount of the common fund of
tax revenues generated by Gilroy's efforts; and (2) the amount of reasonable
attorneys' fees to be paid from this fund.
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Benjamin v. County of Lake,
235 Cal. App. 3d 1574,
91 D.A.R. 14187,
No.A051411 (Nov. 19, 1991).

County Cannot Be Held Liable
in Tort for Failing to Provide
Health Benefits to Indigents
The First District Court of Appeal
has detennined that a county cannot be
held liable in tort for failing to provide
health benefits to indigents as required
by Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000 et seq. In 1986 and 1987,
appellants Matthew Benjamin and
Charlie Wilkerson sought dental care
from Lake County's medically indigent
adult (MIA) clinics; both men were improperly denied dental treatment and
subsequently prepared to file lawsuits
against Lake County. Through its county
counsel, Lake County became aware of
the actions in February 1987; county
counsel apparently contacted the appropriate persons who shortly thereafter
authorized the desired treatment for both
Benjamin and Wilkerson. Although both
men received the care they needed, the
delay in treatment caused their conditions to worsen and caused them pain;
they subsequently brought this action to
seek damages for injury caused due to
that delay.
Government Code section 815 states
the general rule that "[a] public entity is
not liable for an injury, whether such
injury arises out of an act or omission of
the public entity or a public employee
or any other person." An exception to
a ru e is provided in Government
Code section 815.6, which provides that
"[ w]here a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment
that is designed to protect against the
risk of a particular kind of injury, the
public entity is liable for an injury of
that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised
reasonable diligence to discharge the
duty." This section provides a threepronged test for detennining whether
liability may be imposed on a public
entity: (I) an enactment must impose a
mandatory, not discretionary, duty; (2)
the enactment must intend to protect
against the kind of risk of injury suffered by the party asserting section 815 .6
as a basis for liability; and (3) breach of
the mandatory duty must be a proximate cause of the injury suffered. The
court detennined that appellants failed
to satisfy the first and second prongs of
this test.
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Regarding the first prong, the court
noted that Lake County is not a health
care provider. While Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000 et seq. defines the ultimate rights of patients, it
"mandate[s] no specific acts by a
county." Accordingly, "in order to meet
the 'mandatory duty' prong of Government Code section 815.6, Benjamin and
Wilkerson would have to show that Lake
County failed to comply with applicable
statutory or regulatory mandate in adopting its own health care standards, and/
or in imposing those standards on the
health care provider." While acknowledging that Lake County has a mandatory duty to adopt standards which provide for humane care, the court
detennined that "the discretion inherent
in the process of developing and adopting these standards immunizes it from
any claim for damages resulting from
its actions."
As to the second prong, the court
stated that Government Code section
815.6 authorizes governmental liability
for negligence where there is a duty of
care, negligence constituting a breach
of the duty, and injury to the plaintiff as
a proximate cause. The court rationalized that although Benjamin and
Wilkerson are beneficiaries of the duty
imposed by Welfare and Institutions
Code section I 7000, "it does not follow
that Lake County owed Benjamin and
Wilkerson a duty of care under those
sections." According to the court,
"[ w]hether or not a duty of care will be
recognized depends upon a number of
factors reflecting public policy issues."
The court concluded that consideration
of those factors "leaves little doubt but
that no duty of care to M!As, such as
Benjamin and Wilkerson, should be implied into section 17000 et seq."' Thus,
the court held that no cause of action for
damages exists against Lake County
under section I 7000.
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